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Raiffeisenism abroad: why did German cooperative banking 
fail in Ireland but prosper in the Netherlands? 
 
Why did imitations of Raiffeisen’s rural cooperative savings and loans associations work 
well in some European countries, but fail in others? This article considers the example of 
Raiffeisenism in Ireland and in the Netherlands. Raiffeisen banks arrived in both places at 
the same time, but had drastically different fates. In Ireland they were almost wiped out 
by the early 1920s, while in the Netherlands they proved to be a long-lasting institutional 
transplant. Raiffeisen banks were successful in the Netherlands because they operated in a 
niche market with few competitors, while rural financial markets in Ireland were 
unsegmented and populated by long-established incumbents, leaving little room for new 
players, whatever their institutional advantages. Dutch Raiffeisen banks were largely self-
financing, closely integrated into the wider rural economy and able to take advantage of 
economic and religious divisions in rural society. Their Irish counterparts were not. 
 
 
aiffeisen banks were a type of financial intermediary designed in Germany in the mid-nineteenth 
century to provide small-scale financial services to customers in rural areas. Their 
organizational form was then novel; they were owned and operated cooperatively by the people who 
borrowed from them. European rural reformers of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
adopted the Raiffeisen cooperative banking model as a means of empowering and improving the lives 
of farmers.
1
 However, outside Germany their success was variable, despite the efforts of their 
idealistic early propagators; Raiffeisenism prospered in Italy and the Netherlands, failed in Belgium, 
Ireland and Spain, and never even got off the ground in Denmark. This article explores the reasons for 
this variation in performance by comparing their fate in Ireland and the Netherlands. The striking 
features of Raiffeisenism in these countries, on which the comparison focuses, are in: (1) their reliance 
on savings as a source of funding; (2) the levels of integration within and between cooperative 
enterprises; and (3) their treatment of socioreligious and socioeconomic divisions. 
The literature on early cooperative banking in Europe includes the ground-breaking work of 
Guinnane and his co-authors,
2
 who seek to explain the performance of Raiffeisen cooperatives, 
principally in Germany, at the turn of the century. Guinnane’s major contribution has been to argue 
that they were successful because they could overcome by mutuality the information asymmetries and 
enforcement problems that prevented conventional banks from lending to the rural unbanked and 
                                                 
1
 Parallels between cooperative banks in the past and microfinance institutions today have been drawn by various 
scholars (see Bátiz-Lazo and Billings, ‘New perspectives’, for a review of the recent literature).  
2
 Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane, ‘Thy neighbor’s keeper’; Ghatak and Guinnane, ‘The economics’; Guinnane, 
‘Cooperatives as information machines’; Guinnane, ‘Delegated monitors’; Guinnane, ‘A “friend and advisor”’. 
R 
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underbanked. His research on Raiffeisenism in Ireland was the first to apply information economics to 
aspects of the island’s economic history.3 However, his work largely discounts the possibility that 
factors unrelated to these banks’ institutional design account for their dismal histories. By 
complementing Guinnane’s institutional approach with the functional perspective popularised by 
Merton,
4
 and by comparing the Irish case with the contemporaneous and ultimately more successful 
imitation of Raiffeisen banks in the Netherlands, this article reconsiders Guinnane’s arguments. 
Starting not with the institutional structure of financial intermediaries, but with the economic functions 
needed of them, Merton’s functional perspective asks how these are best provided. Rather than 
looking at a single case of Raiffeisenism abroad, the comparative approach contrasts largely similar 
societies which yet differ in the factors under review, enabling more robust inferences to be drawn. 
Guinnane’s central thesis is that in Ireland’s case ‘cooperatives did potentially fill an important gap in 
rural credit markets’,5 but the methodological approach of the present essay concludes that they did 
not; Irish credit cooperatives disappeared because rural savers and lenders were adequately served by 
pre-existing functionally-equivalent competitors, principally the joint stock banks (JSBs) and the Post 
Office Savings Bank (POSB).  
Existing accounts of Raiffeisenism abroad motivate this article’s choice of methodology and 
indicate where its contribution lies. Histories of the experience of Raiffeisenism in Western Europe 
rely on country-specific studies.
6
 Recent essays on Raiffeisenism in Eastern Europe consider several at 
once, encouraging comparison.
7
 Despite this move, the restricted view of previous studies means that 
they cannot distinguish between factors peculiar to given cases and universal analyses of cooperative 
performance. Parallels are drawn only with Raiffeisenism in Germany, but are inadequate because 
they assume that the apparently successful German institution evolved by definition as superior. Such 
assumptions have blinded scholars to other institutions that were functionally equivalent to 
Raiffeisen’s banks. Section I’s comparison of the origins and early history of Dutch and Irish 
                                                 
3
 Guinnane, ‘A failed institutional transplant’. 
4
 Merton, ‘A functional perspective’; Merton and Bodie, ‘A conceptual framework’. 
5
 Guinnane, ‘A failed institutional transplant’, p. 39. 
6
 Belgium’s cooperative spaar- en leengilden (savings and loans guilds) failed in the Great Depression after 
lending excess deposits to risky large non-agricultural business ventures (Van Molle, ‘Savings and loans’); 
Denmark’s sognesparekasser (parish savings banks) left little room to introduce cooperatively-owned rural 
banks (Henriksen and Guinnane, ‘Why Danish credit co-operatives’); Italy’s casse rurali (rural banks)  
succeeded by exploiting cultural and social factors (Galassi, ‘Measuring social capital’); and Spain’s cajas 
rurales (rural savings banks) were very unsuccessful, largely for political reasons (Garrido, ‘Why did most 
cooperatives fail?’). 
7
 Lorenz (ed.), Cooperatives in ethnic conflicts, suggests that Raiffeisen banks worked in Eastern Europe by 
embedding themselves in the ethnic and political movements of minority populations. 
3 
Raiffeisenism suggests that the polities form a matched pair, in their broadly similar agricultural 
sectors and religious heterogeneity. These commonalities enable the present study to better identify the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the long-run success of Europe’s early cooperative banks. 
Three findings emerge from section II, which compares the function and design of 
Raiffeisenism in Ireland and the Netherlands. The first, discussed in section III, is that savings rates 
were a key success factor of the Raiffeisen model. Unlike their German progenitors, both Dutch and 
Irish cooperators chose to adopt institutional names with no reference to saving. In practice, however, 
Dutch cooperatives retained an emphasis on savings; to finance their loan books boerenleenbanken 
(farmers’ lending banks) relied on members’ deposits rather than external borrowing. By contrast, 
concessional state loans were the main source of finance for Ireland’s Raiffeisen banks, known locally 
as agricultural banks or agricultural credit societies.  
The second, discussed in section IV, is that the close integration, both horizontal and vertical, 
of different cooperative enterprises was an important determinant of success. In the Netherlands, 
Raiffeisen banks enjoyed strong federated apex institutions and overlapped in membership and 
management with other local cooperative enterprises which they financed. By contrast, cooperatives in 
Ireland showed few signs of integration.  
The third finding, discussed in sections V and VI, is that socioreligious and socioeconomic 
division led in the Netherlands to a dichotomous cooperative banking structure for Catholics and 
Protestants, with strong independent cooperative networks, attracting all strata of society. However, 
though cooperatives were promoted as compatible with Roman Catholicism, the majority religion in 
Ireland, the political economy of Irish rural society seems to have discouraged them from taking root. 
Together, these three findings suggest not only that Dutch and Irish forms of cooperative 
banking had important institutional differences, but also that they differed crucially in the functions 
they performed (section VII). Dutch Raiffeisen banks successfully exploited and dominated a niche 
market where few competitors could offer equivalent services, while their Irish counterparts faced stiff 
competition from incumbents that performed similar economic functions. Dutch Raiffeisen banks used 
their institutional characteristics to gain a central position in Dutch rural society, while their Irish 
cousins gained little from being cooperative. 
 
I  
The historical context of this article is the “Grain Invasion”: the late nineteenth century integration of 
global agricultural markets and its effect on prices.
8
 While France, Italy and the German Empire 
                                                 
8
 O’Rourke, ‘The European grain invasion’. In British historiography, this has traditionally been termed the 
Great Depression (Capie and Wood, ‘Great Depression’), and in the Dutch the Grote Landbouwcrisis (the Great 
Agricultural Crisis) (Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland). 
4 
attempted to stem the tide with protectionist barriers, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK (of which 
Ireland was part) did not.
9
 Dutch and Irish farmers had to rely on land-saving technologies, such as 
chemical fertilizers, concentrated animal feeds, superior breeds of seed and livestock, and innovative 
methods of agricultural organization, such as cooperative enterprises.
10 
The diffusion of German-designed credit cooperatives abroad was particularly important in 
the wider history of agricultural cooperation in Europe. Broadly, cooperatives of three kinds formed in 
German states: Schulze-Delitzsch, Raiffeisen and Haas. Each strand had a distinct interpretation of its 
economic function and institutional structure. By far the most frequent to be copied abroad was the 
second. Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen (1818-1888), whose name passed to this type, established the 
first of his cooperative banks in Rhenish Prussia in the 1840s,
11
 but it took almost 40 years for them to 
‘perceptibly multiply’.12 Data collected by Prinz show that the number of Raiffeisen societies grew 
from 63 in 1875 to 121 in 1881, and 713 in 1892.
13
 1894, the year in which the first Raiffeisen society 
was established in the southwest of Ireland, saw 980 German Raiffeisen banks; the number had 
reached 2,014 in 1897, a year after the first Dutch Raiffeisen bank was opened, near the German 
border. 
The Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (IAOS), a cooperative advocacy body founded in 
Dublin, organized cooperative banks across the Irish countryside wherever it determined credit was 
needed, partly to combat “gombeenism”, a pejorative term for usurious moneylending. 14  The 
traditional argument put forward in the Dutch historiography is that boerenleenbanken were created in 
response to an unfulfilled demand for credit in rural areas – a view Bieleman has held as recently as 
2008.
15  
The root of this view lies with the Dutch government’s agricultural inquiries of the late 
                                                 
9
 Webb, ‘Agricultural protection’; Van Zanden, ‘The first green revolution’; Henriksen, Lampe and Sharp, ‘The 
strange birth’. 
10
 Additionally, in the Netherlands, the amount of available land was increased through reclamation works 
(Knibbe, Agriculture in the Netherlands, p. 48); and in Ireland, farmers revived their tradition of mass 
emigration (Hobsbawm, The age of empire, p. 36). 
11
 Digby, The world co-operative movement, p. 76.  
12
 Wolff, Peoples’ banks, p. 71. Birchall, The international co-operative movement, dates the first such mutual 
society to 1862, while Guinnane, ‘A “friend and advisor”’, to 1864. 
13
 M. Prinz, ‘German rural cooperatives, Friedrich-Wilhelm Raiffeisen and the organization of trust’, XIIth 
Meeting of the International Economic History Association, Buenos Aires (2002). 
14
 Report from the S. C. (P.P. 1898). 
15
 Bieleman, Boeren in Nederland. This argument recurs in corporate histories of the Dutch rural cooperative 
banking movement: Campen et al., Landbouw en landbouwcrediet; Weststrate, Gedenkboek; Sluyterman et al., 




 and with propaganda from Dutch cooperative banks at the time, such as Van der 
Marck’s 1924 pamphlet.17  
By the end of the 1910s, a dense network of boerenleenbanken served the whole Dutch 
countryside; some 18 per cent of the population
18
 deposited about 32 per cent of the nation’s savings 
with them.
19
 In Ireland, their growth was not sustained, but the Danish-inspired cooperative creameries 
introduced simultaneously met greater success.
20
 Figure 1 plots the number of Raiffeisen banks in both 
polities relative to their populations and shows that Ireland’s experiment with cooperative banking 
failed long before the Irish War of Independence. 
[Insert figure 1] 
 
II 
Raiffeisenism was not unopposed in Germany; Guinnane demonstrates that different competing 
institutions, some considerably more successful than others, operated simultaniously.
21
 Nonetheless, 
Raiffeisen’s banking model was the one to be introduced to the Dutch and Irish countryside.22 Below 
is a contemporary outline of its principles:
23
 
Everyone who knows anything at all of agricultural co-operation is familiar with the main features 
of the system, namely, unlimited liability, an area restricted to a village or two, small shares, 
limited dividends or no dividends at all, indivisible reserve, loans to members only, low rates of 
interest and honorary management controlled by the general assembly of members, each of whom 
has one vote and no more. In detail one country or province may vary from another, but the ground 
principles are everywhere the same, and wherever they are found and however they appear to be 
derived, their ultimate origin is Germany and their sponsor Raiffeisen. 
The institutional attributes of Raiffeisen cooperatives in Ireland and the Netherlands compared 
with Germany’s (table 1) reveal how far the three cases reflect this succinct description. The 
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 Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Landbouwcommissie, 1886-1891, access no. 2.11.25, inv. no. 6. 
17
 Van der Marck, Boerenleenbanken. This pamphlet, and previous editions before it, was widely distributed 
among local Raiffeisen banks. Its author, Van der Marck, was the geestelijke adviseur (spiritual advisor) to the 
leading Catholic-aligned Raiffeisen network. 
18
 Calculated using the 1920 census (http://www.volkstellingen.nl/) and the annual reports of the three 
cooperative central banks (CCB, Jaarverslag 1919; CCCB, Jaarverslag 1919; CCRB, Jaarverslag 1919). If by 
1920 the Netherlands’ rural population represent 55 per cent of their total (United Nations, Growth, p. 105), then 
perhaps all rural Dutch households had a Raiffeisen account. 
19
 Sluyterman et al., Het coöperatieve alternatief, p. 40. 
20
 Breathnach, ‘The diffusion’.  
21
 Guinnane, ‘A “friend and advisor”’, p. 263. 
22
 The reason why Raiffeisen’s model was more successfully marketed abroad than any of these others is an 
unresolved question. 
23
 Darling, Some aspects, p. 18. 
6 
regulatory regime of all three polities let cooperatives choose among liability options, corporate 
governance structures and business restrictions – albeit with various differences in the enterprise forms 
used. The liability structure was always unlimited, although the legal regime of all three allowed 
otherwise. Raiffeisen cooperatives’ banking activities were conducted at a local level in all three 
places, the area restriction outlined by Darling; but in the Netherlands, different Raiffeisen banks often 
competed within the same locality. Moreover, none of the polities had banks with shareholdings; 
membership usually required a signature on a registry and some nominal deposit. Loans were always 
granted exclusively to members; since membership was not a pre-requisite for savings, many 
depositors joined only when they needed a loan. 
[Insert table 1] 
At least two cosignatories were normally required to secure loans in all three polities.
24
 Loan 
terms in Germany and the Netherlands varied in length and ceilings were not mandatory, but a series 
of checks and balances prevented abuse; for example, in the Netherlands large loans required 
authorisation from a central apex institution. Dutch cooperatives appear to have adjusted loan terms to 
clients’ risk by varying the size and period of the loan, not the interest rate.25 Ireland, by contrast, 
operated under a legislatively imposed loan ceiling of £50 and the IAOS encouraged cooperatives to 
restrict themselves to short-term lending.
26
 All three governments gave support and subsidy: German 
Raiffeisen cooperatives received subsidized loans; in the Netherlands subsidization came in the form 
of small start-up grants; and in Ireland, state bodies offered loans at concessional rates of interest. 
In all three polities, cooperative banks were unit independent and affiliated to various apex 
institutions. In Germany these institutions were regional, while in the Netherlands they were 
theoretically national and apolitical, but in practice divided to reflect the strong socioreligious division 
of Dutch society – a phenomenon known as verzuiling (pillarization).27 In both Germany and the 
Netherlands, apex institutions, acting as clearinghouses and auditors, were cooperatively owned by 
member cooperatives (federated “cooperatives’ cooperatives”): distinct institutions in Germany, but 
united in the Netherlands in organizations called centrale banken (central banks). Ireland, by contrast, 
did not develop such institutions. Its apex, the IAOS, helped establish individual cooperatives (banks, 
creameries and stores) and provided auditing services, but was unfederated and not a clearinghouse. 
Cooperative integration, between cooperative banks and also among other cooperative enterprises, 
                                                 
24
 Sowers, ‘The role of social networks’, finds that loan cosignatories were often borrowers too, causing dense 
interconnected networks of financial ties between Raiffeisen cooperators. 
25
 E.g., the boerenleenbank in Capelle, Noord-Brabant, always adopted an interest rate very close to that at 
which it could borrow money, managing risk instead by altering the loan principal (Archief Rabobank Langstraat 
(henceforth ARL), Capelle NB, Bestuursnotulen Boerenleenbank Capelle). 
26
 Anderson, With Plunkett, p. 252.  
27
 Van Eijnatten and Van Lieburg, Nederlandse religiegeschiedenis. 
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distinguished Raiffeisenism in Germany and the Netherlands from Ireland, where little integration 
appeared. 
Comparing the agricultural sectors of these polities reveals some similarities but noticeable 
differences (tables 2 and 3). Regarding the output per hectare of arable land, Ireland resembled the 
Netherlands in wheat, barley, oats and potatoes and both showed higher output than Germany. Ireland 
had a higher ratio of cattle and sheep per 1,000 population than the other two.
28
 Over time, a 
noticeable difference was the Dutch focus on dairy versus livestock production and the rapid 
expansion of horticulture.
29
 The data suggest that all three had similar farm sizes – mainly small-scale 
– but that farm ownership differed.30 While these data take little account of Irish and Dutch regional 
specialisation, they suggest overall that Raiffeisenism was introduced to largely comparable 
agricultural structures and hence that the success or failure of the movement depended more on other 
factors. 
[Insert tables 2 and 3] 
What factors might these be? Possible answers in the Irish case are found in the work of 
Guinnane: (1) competition in savings markets from the POSB; (2) lack of strong union federations; 
and (3) prevailing norms in rural Ireland.
31 (1) Guinnane argues that Raiffeisenism’s failure in Ireland 
and success in Germany cannot be based on the presence or absence of a state-owned savings bank 
like the POSB. He supports his argument by noting that Germany also had savings banks, municipal 
rather than national, similar in function to the POSB. But Ireland too had such municipal banks, which 
dramatically declined in number and scale as the new POSB expanded in the late nineteenth century. 
How could the POSB enter Ireland in 1863 and outdo these? (2) Guinnane argues that Ireland had no 
institutional equivalents to the German audit unions and central clearinghouses at the apex. He finds 
the lack of audit unions more detrimental, since they provided external management and support. Why 
were such institutional structures not developed in Ireland? (3) Guinnane asserts that one reason for 
the failure of Irish cooperatives was that the ‘norms of Irish society’ made cooperative systems 
difficult to work.
32 Using a statement from the 1926 banking commission, he suggests that ‘rural Irish 
people did not give “full recognition of the justice of the debt so incurred,” and thus resisted efforts to 
force repayment of loans’.33 Guinnane’s interpretation has implications for the wider history of Irish 
banking: if the rural Irish resisted attempts to enforce repayments, how were Ireland’s other financial 
institutions able to function? 
                                                 
28
 Upper-bound estimates; a greater proportion of Ireland was rural than either Germany or the Netherlands. 
29
 Knibbe, Agriculture in the Netherlands. 
30
 Mitchell, International historical statistics; Henning, Deutsche wirtschafts- und sozialgeschichte. 
31
 Guinnane, ‘A failed institutional transplant’. 
32
 Ibid., p. 39. 
33
 Ibid., p. 57. 
8 
The literature on the Dutch success story is dominated by corporate business histories that take 
an idealistic view of their emergence.
34  Rommes’s forthcoming book on the wider origins of 
cooperation in the Netherlands breaks this trend, arguing that Dutch rural financial services were 
already ample when cooperatives entered the market in the late 1890s.
35
 He argues that kassiers, small 
private cashiers, were good alternative sources of funds and were especially active in the northern 
Netherlands, precisely where Raiffeisen banks arrived last. However, his implied conclusion that there 
was therefore little demand for boerenleenbanken appears over-stated and does not explain their 
exceptional performance during the severe domestic and international financial crises of the 1920s and 
1930s.
36
 In common with other works on Dutch rural cooperation, Rommes focuses more on the 
market for credit than the market for savings deposits. What happens to his explanation of 
Raiffeisenism if this focus is reversed? Moreover, are Guinnane’s three findings transferable to the 
Dutch case? 
Using insights from the above comparisons as points of departure, this article advances three 
interrelated explanations for the varying success of Raiffeisenism abroad: (1) how cooperatives were 
funded; (2) how far they became integrated into the rural economy; and (3) how far they could exploit 
the religious and economic divisions in rural society. 
 
III 
Rural activists in both Ireland and the Netherlands perceived a need for Raiffeisen banks; but their 
subsequent economic function in these polities diverged. How does this help explain Dutch success 
and Irish failure? Contemporaries at the IAOS and in Dutch farmers’ unions had the same argument: 
any problems faced by farmers wanting financial services would be solved by cooperative banks. 
Their descriptions of market conditions suggest that the financial intermediaries at the time practised 
either “credit rationing” or “red-lining”.37 Credit rationing implies that banks might increase their 
market share and attract more borrowers even by increasing interest rates or collateral requirements, 
but hesitate to do so due to the high risk of the proposed projects or to some information asymmetry 
                                                 
34
 See, e.g., Mooij, De Rabobank. 
35
 Rommes, Voor en door boeren? 
36
 A succinct history of boerenleenbanken in the interwar period is found in Mooij, ‘De brandkast’. 
37
 Credit rationing, an equilibrium concept, occurs when borrowers’ demand for credit is turned down, even if 
these borrowers are willing and able to pay both the interest rate and meet the collateral requirements of 
prevailing loan contracts. Red-lining – a term originally coined to describe the practice of marking a red line on a 
map to delineate areas where banks would not invest, and later linked to discrimination – occurs when complete 
categories of borrowers are totally excluded from the credit market because they do not have the necessary future 
cash flows or collateral to service loans at prevailing prices (Freixas and Rochet, Microeconomics of banking, p. 
172). 
9 
which makes business performance unverifiable.
38
 Red-lining, conversely, implies that banks could 
increase their market share only by reducing interest rates and collateral requirements, but demur 
because they judge the probable returns insufficient. 
While both credit rationing and red-lining force farmers to self-finance their projects, or 
shelve them entirely, they imply very different functions for both present and intending suppliers of 
rural financial services. Red-lining implies that, thanks to lower overheads, Raiffeisen banks were 
uniquely placed to offer financial services to first-time users by lowering prevailing prices. Credit 
rationing, by contrast, implies that cooperatives acted as niche players, serving borrowers excluded 
from credit markets because of the (perceived) riskiness of their line of business. When combined with 
credit rationing, the presence of information asymmetries may separate credit markets by risk-type:
39
 
borrowers may self-select into different groups according to their risk profile, with high-risk borrowers 
seeking out lenders offering high interest rates and low collateral requirements, and low-risk 
borrowers seeking low interest rates and high collateral requirements. The question then is: were 
incumbents in rural financial markets in Ireland and the Netherlands engaging in red-lining, or credit 
rationing? If it was the latter: did rural financial markets segment? And: were cooperatives serving 
high-risk, low-risk or both types of customer?  
The ignorance of the IAOS delegates to the 1898 parliamentary inquiry about the subject of 
JSBs – the major players in Ireland’s rural economy – and their confusion over what constituted 
gombeenism indicate a serious lack of understanding in Ireland among cooperatives’ instigators.40 The 
inquiry revealed that a JSB branch located where a new Raiffeisen society was set up had long ago 
closed for lack of business. Though the IAOS was told that Raiffeisen banks would have to open in 
places not served by JSBs, because these were already adequate for the areas in which they operated, it 
responded that cooperatives had advantages over JSBs and would benefit farmers wherever they were 
set up. At this stage, the IAOS felt that incumbents were credit rationing, and that their new 
cooperatives would be able to displace their competitors.  
The later actions of the IAOS suggest that they gradually realised their own limitations, that 
they would struggle to outdo JSBs on their home turf. In 1902 the IAOS signed an agreement giving 
all cooperative enterprises concessional rates from the JSBs in return for promising not to let 
cooperative banks mobilize deposits.
41
 The IAOS then took trouble to declare that its Raiffeisen 
societies were not the JSBs’ rivals. Indeed, in a government inquiry into agricultural credit in Ireland, 
George Russell, a charismatic IAOS official, described Raiffeisen societies as auxiliary JSBs, de facto 
                                                 
38
 Stiglitz and Weiss, ‘Credit rationing’. 
39
 Bester, ‘Screening vs rationing’. 
40
 Report from the S. C. (P.P. 1898). Regarding JSBs, their information was based on anecdotal accounts of 
banking practice. 
41
 IAOS, Annual report 1904, p. 27; Third report of the R. C. (P.P. 1907), p. 55. 
10 
branches in isolated areas.
42 
The IAOS appears to have turned around, deciding that Ireland’s major 
financial services providers were not credit rationing, but rather red-lining, in refusing to serve the 
areas where they judged the returns were too low. In their view, it was up to Raiffeisen banks to serve 
there since they could reduce prevailing prices thanks to their unique ownership structure and business 
model. Their subsequent performance implies that these were insufficient. 
Jonker and Brusse’s micro-business histories of boerenleenbanken in the mostly Catholic 
southern Netherlands suggest that the market for agricultural credit was already satiated when 
cooperatives arrived.
43 
More generally, Rommes argues that Raiffeisen banks reached the Netherlands 
later than its neighbours precisely because other good sources were available.
44 
This argument implies 
that the sector’s origins could not have been demand-led. Furthermore, Jonker shows that the new 
cooperative banks largely catered for savers, who could already use the Rijkspostspaarbank, a state-
owned bank based on the POSB. He argues that the cooperatives created no new market for banking 
services, only unwanted extra competition. These studies suggest that the incumbents were credit 
rationing: credit was available, but the only way to attract more custom was to offer services to risk-
loving individuals willing to pay higher interest rates with low collateral requirements.  
It is the contention here that boerenleenbanken succeeded because they changed the rules of 
the game: offering cheap integrated savings and loans services meant they could both displace 
competitors in, and further expand, the markets for savings and loans. Lower fixed costs came from 
not paying management, operating from cashiers’ personal premises and opening only for short 
periods.
45
 Combined with a system of cosignatories and unlimited liability, these low costs meant low 
interest rates in return for higher, if non-traditional, collateral; Raiffeisen societies could poach low-
risk borrowers from incumbents, leaving only high-risk borrowers behind. The absence of bank 
failures among boerenleenbanken in the 1920s financial crisis is testament to this; cooperatives were 
cherry-picking the safe customers, ignoring the riskier ones implied in the arguments of Jonker, Brusse 
and Rommes.  
What was the attitude of the cooperative movement’s leaders towards incumbent credit 
suppliers? Irish cooperative propagandists reserved a special hatred for gombeenism,
 
a term that had 
come to include all non-bank incumbents: moneylenders, loan sharks, and consumer credit.
46  
As 
                                                 
42
 Report of the D.C. (P.P. 1914), p. 63. 
43
 Jonker, ‘Welbegrepen eigenbelang’; Brusse, De dynamische regio. 
44
 Rommes, Voor en door boeren? 
45
 See, e.g., descriptions of various local boerenleenbanken in Vercauteren et al., Boeren gingen bankieren. 
46
 See, e.g., the views of Plunkett, ‘Agricultural organisation’; Finlay, ‘The usurer in Ireland’; Report of the D.C. 
(P.P. 1914); Russell, Co-operation and nationality. The difficulty of defining “gombeenism” extends beyond 
contemporaries (Gibbon and Higgins, ‘Patronage’; Kennedy, ‘A sceptical view’; Gibbon and Higgins, ‘The Irish 
“gombeenman”’). 
11 
usurious moneylending was admittedly rare, the main butt of IAOS complaints was shopkeepers’ 
credit: the difference between the prices of goods bought on credit and outright. Shopkeepers were 
also a target in the Netherlands: Van der Marck complains of them too.
47 
However, it is hard to 
ascertain the exact extent of gombeenism, if any, in either country. The baseline reports of the 
Congested District Board for Ireland (CDB), a development body for Ireland’s poorest regions, 
suggest that effective interest rates were not extortionate.
48
 And in the Netherlands, rural producer 
cooperatives had shifted the balance of power from shopkeepers to farmers long before the advent of 
Raiffeisenism there.
49 
Why then were cooperative banks successful only in the Netherlands, if the cooperatives’ 
propaganda reveals a common foe? The crucial difference was that an Irish incumbent service 
provider had no Dutch equivalent: the deposit-mobilizing JSB.
50
 In 1891, Ireland hosted nine such 
institutions, operating 533 branches, with 114 branches per million capita, holding £34 million in 
deposits; by 1911 the number of branches had increased to 813, 189 branches per million capita, with 
deposits of £57 million.
51
 Although they did not serve the entire island, they operated an accessible 
network and were heavily used by agriculturalists.
52
 Even cooperatives used their clearing services. 
Branching in the Netherlands, however, commenced in earnest only after the Rotterdamsche 
Bankvereeniging started buying up provincial banking houses in the early 1910s.
53
 O’Gráda states that 
‘on balance, Irish farmers were creditors rather than debtors to [JSBs]’. 54  In the Netherlands, 
Raiffeisen banks were predominantly used for savings, demonstrated by the finding that most banks 
were unleveraged.
55
 While Dutch farmers increasingly saved in the new cooperatives, Irish farmers did 
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48
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not, sticking instead to incumbents.
 
Ironically, it was probably before the advent of Raiffeisen’s 
cooperative ideas that the JSBs eradicated gombeenism in Ireland.
56
 
As seen, Guinnane argues that the POSB was a major factor in explaining the Irish failure. 
However, his account of the POSB is somewhat mistaken; he states that ‘deposits and withdrawals 
could be made in any amount’.57 From its inception, the POSB accepted deposits from one shilling to a 
maximum of £30 per year.
58 
It was not until 1915 that savings deposits escaped such limits, in order to 
obtain cheaper war finance. JSBs, not fully acknowledged as major incumbents in savings markets in 
rural Ireland by Guinnane,
59
 had no such limitations and accepted deposits as low as £1.
60
 While the 
POSB did serve small savers – deposits under £1 were made by most of its depositors – these 
accounted for only about 9.5 per cent of its total deposits.
61
 The POSB required notice to withdraw 
involving formal application to its London headquarters, a process usually requiring a week.
62
 
Raiffeisen cooperatives required a month’s notice.63 JSBs paid out on demand. More importantly still, 
the POSB did not provide the lending services of the JSBs, which granted loans, on similar terms to 
cooperative banks, from £1 upwards.
64
 Irish cooperatives did not, as Guinnane suggests,
 65
 make long-
term loans like their German counterparts; instead, loan terms were set at one year, with loans 
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guaranteed by co-signers and repaid in regular instalments,
66
 much like the JSB system of co-signed 
loans.
 
The unrecognized debts mentioned by Guinnane were mortgage debts; Irish JSBs adapted to 
their market and were able to overcome any such problem by using personal guarantors in their loan 
contracts. Guarantors usually had to be known to their bank – through deposits – and would therefore 
have an incentive to monitor their peers. This incentive structure was absent in the Irish Raiffeisen 
banks, which did not mobilize deposits. In the sense of providing both savings and loans services, 
JSBs were functionally equivalent to both the Dutch and German Raiffeisen banks; the POSB was not. 
Interest rates paid to customers of boerenleenbanken were sometimes one percentage point 
higher than those of the Rijkspostspaarbank;
67
 in Ireland the difference between interest rates offered 
by agricultural banks and those of the POSB was bigger still.
68
 But while boerenleenbanken easily 
poached the customers of the government’s savings institution, or at least attracted more new 
customers,
69
 Ireland’s Raiffeisen societies did not. Neither the Dutch nor the Irish institutional 
transplants had the state guarantee enjoyed by their post office rivals. Whereas Dutch Raiffeisen banks 
could independently attract deposits and did not have to use expensive outside financing, their Irish 
cousins relied on concessional state loans and interbank borrowing to fund their loan books and 
channelled any excess savings through JSBs.
70
 In the tense political environment of the Land Wars, 
Irish savers appear to have preferred the safety of the POSB guarantee, remembering in particular the 
frauds and failures of municipal savings banks.
71
 Dutch depositors had no such fears and chose 
whichever institution offered the highest return, or at least whichever represented their social views 
more closely (section V). It was the activities in the market for deposits that enabled 
boerenleenbanken to operate so successfully in the market for loans. Tellingly, the few Irish Raiffeisen 
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societies that could mobilize savings proved to be the most durable, such as the Columbkille 





The horizontal and vertical integration of cooperative enterprises was a key feature of Raiffeisenism in 
Germany and its imitation in the Netherlands; does its absence in Ireland help explain its divergent 
history? The lack of vertical integration in Ireland did not go unnoticed by contemporaries. Hugh de 
Fellenberg Montgomery, a leading Unionist landlord who investigated banks in Germany in 1903 on 




In many respects the Raiffeisen Organisation offers, probably, the best model for the organisation 
of agricultural co-operative societies; but the difficulty of adopting it as a pattern for Irish 
agricultural co-operative organisation arises from the circumstance that it is specially framed for 
the benefit of savings and loan societies doing supply business and that productive societies (dairy 
societies &c.) were an afterthought in this organisation. […] In Ireland the dairy societies came 
first, the supply associations next, and the credit societies last. [italics sic] 
A British parliamentary inquiry also discussed the value of vertical integration for Ireland, 
highlighting as institutional best practice the German custom of integrating cooperative banks and 
wholesale purchasers.
74
 Indeed, Deeg suggests that German cooperative banks could be viewed as 
functionally equivalent to universal banks,
75
 Germany’s integrated commercial and investment 
banking conglomerates, which overlapped management with the enterprises they financed and had 
similarly wide spectra of financial services.
 
From a theoretical perspective, vertical and horizontal integration can be seen as an important 
advantage of cooperative enterprise: providing economies of scale and scope, eliminating double 
marginalisation, and, perhaps more importantly, combating ex post moral hazard with cheap 
information on income flows from farming enterprises. The importance of associating with other 
cooperatives may also reflect cross-subsidization within the cooperative structure; other parts of the 
vertically-integrated business may have been more profitable, or may have had access to better 
management. Horizontal integration was common in Germany and the Netherlands through central 
banks which enabled the Raiffeisen societies to diversify risk and re-distribute surplus local savings. 
This important aspect of Raiffeisenism was not encouraged in Ireland, but some of these advantages 
were captured instead by JSBs through branching and mobilizing savings deposits. 
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Douma uses transaction cost economics to explain why cooperative businesses proved more 
successful in some markets than others.
76
 He posits that different forms of business organization 
compete with one another, and that following a shakeout, only those that prove to be most suited to 
their business environment survive. Using the case of the Dutch dairy industry in the late nineteenth 
century, he argues that cooperative dairies could not displace private creameries in urban areas 
because the latter had invested in sophisticated fresh milk distribution networks. The cooperative form 
proved better suited to rural banking; their organizational form let boerenleenbanken displace kassiers 
for loan customers and the Rijkspostspaarbank for depositors. Cooperatives were most appropriate 
where the costs of downstream business were too high for conventionally owned banks to profit. 
Dutch cooperatives enjoyed a high degree of enforced vertical integration; Raiffeisen banks there 
often stipulated that members also belong to the local chapter of a (confessional) farming union. Other 




Meanwhile, in Ireland, alternative types of cooperative enterprise with similar functions were 
promoted independently, effectively competing with one another; cooperative dairies and purchasing 
stores also offered short-term credit to members and ‘creamery loans’ were reported as being in 
significantly higher supply than loans from cooperative banks.
78
 There were a few notable exceptions 
where Raiffeisen societies were vertically integrated into other local cooperatives; some surviving 
correspondence from agricultural banks was written on the stationery of dairy cooperatives, suggesting 
at the very least overlapping management.
79
 On the whole, however, Irish Raiffeisen banks did not 
enjoy the same success; unable or unwilling to integrate, they were judged by Ireland’s agricultural 
cooperatives to be inefficient and costly alternatives to JSBs.  
As Guinnane highlights, Ireland’s cooperative banks never integrated horizontally, developing 
neither audit unions nor cooperative clearinghouses.
80
 The IAOS performed auditing duties, but 
expensively and it soon chose instead to focus on more profitable aspects of its cooperative portfolio: 
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creameries and stores. The IAOS had threatened to establish its own central clearinghouse in 1901;
 
it 
did so in order to force JSBs to lend to the wider cooperative movement at concessional rates of 
interest.
 81
 As noted, a favourable agreement was reached in return for the promise of cooperative 
banks not to mobilize savings but instead use JSBs as de facto clearing houses.
 
While this may have 
hurt them in the long run, at the time this was an expedient solution – a case of cooperative realpolitik. 
Concessional loans from various government bodies were their other source of funding. Irish 
Raiffeisen banks’ structure of liabilities could be maintained only if these arrangements were static, an 
unlikely prospect: after political wrangling government bodies withdrew their support for Raiffeisen 
banks, while volatile international markets following the 1907 financial crisis saw JSBs unilaterally 
alter the IAOS-brokered agreements.
82
 In summary, the IAOS chose to forgo horizontal integration for 
its cooperatives, and in the process weakened the balance-sheets of its Raiffeisen banks and 
undermined the case for vertical integration, since other parts of the IAOS portfolio were able to 
access non-cooperative financial services.
83
  
This lack of horizontal and vertical cooperative integration in Ireland may have resulted from 
the way that cooperative enterprises were established there, in contrast with the Netherlands’ case. 
Most discussion in the cooperative literature on the development of central institutions emphasises 
individual cooperatives combining at a “higher level”.84 While this characterisation roughly applies to 
the Netherlands, in Ireland the sequence was more definitely reversed; there the central organization 
created local cooperatives, in top-down development. The IAOS established the first Irish Raiffeisen 
society in Doneraile, Co. Cork, in 1894. It was not until 1912, the twilight of Irish Raiffeisenism, that 
the first cooperative enterprise was founded on the initiative of farmers, because ‘in former years the 
initiative had been taken in all cases by our [IAOS] organisers’.85  
The role of the IAOS was outlined by IAOS President, Horace Plunkett, as follows: ‘In the 
first instance it was to consist of philanthropic persons, but its constitution provided for the inclusion 
in its membership of the societies which had already been created and those which it would itself 
create as time went on’.86 Giving evidence in a money-lending inquiry, he said that the role of the 
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IAOS was to ‘persuade’ people to adopt cooperation, which it did by hiring travelling organizers to 
talk to rural groups and explain the benefits of cooperative methods. George Russell, one such 
organizer, enticed the crowds with promises of concessional state loans.
87  
Meanwhile, in the 
Netherlands, propagandists were significantly more active in Catholic networks; priests were invited 
to lecture at special meetings of the Catholic farmers’ unions on the benefits of cooperative banking.88 
The central bank would then provide farmers with the necessary literature and legal advice to set up a 
local bank.
89 
Unlike the Irish case, however, the propaganda often continued long after a cooperative’s 
original foundation; the Catholic Church maintained informal links with “their” cooperatives by 
installing parish priests or other church officials as spiritual advisers to their board of directors.
90
 It is 
this link between banking and religion, the subject of the following section, which appears to have 
been key to the Dutch success. 
 
V 
Ostensibly, Ireland had a similar confessional divide to the Netherlands. But while Dutch cooperatives 
benefited from religious and economic division, their Irish counterparts did not. While division led to 
peaceful segregation in Dutch rural society, it was a major cause of social strife on the island of 
Ireland. This is especially apparent from contrasting the histories of the Dutch and Irish cooperative 
movements’ apex institutions. 
By the late nineteenth century, most Dutch citizens identified themselves with a particular 
religious denomination, primarily Roman Catholicism, and the liberal hervormde (Dutch Reformed) 
and orthodox gereformeerde (literally “re-reformed”) forms of Calvinism. Dutch enterprise and 
society intensified segregation along religious lines, with different Christian denominations 
developing sophisticated parallel economies in a process of verzuiling, each with its own schools, 
political parties, newspapers, trade unions, hospitals and even banks. The argument put forward, or 
implied, in the existing literature is that socio-political interest groups – the Catholic clergy above all – 
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were crucial in creating the first cooperative banks; these groups viewed cooperatives as a way of 
consolidating or extending their political influence.
91 
The verzuiling of Dutch cooperation was a function of the earlier confessionalization of rural 
agricultural politics. A national Nederlandsch Landbouw-Comité (NLC) was established in 1884 to 
stimulate the improvement of agricultural technology and tackle disease in cattle.
92 
However, the 
Catholic press argued that this new grouping did not benefit Catholics as much as Protestants. Support 
grew for the creation of Catholic-only enterprises in response to Rerum Novarum, a Papal Encyclical 
in support of anti-socialist confessional trade unionism.
93 
A new organization for Dutch agriculturalists 
emerged in 1895: the Nederlandsche Boerenbond (NBB). The creation of federated regional unions 
followed, the largest of which was the Noordbrabantse Christelijke Boerenbond (NCB). These 
organizations poached the NLC’s members, or at least mobilized segments of rural society 
traditionally overlooked by the NLC. The new unions were predominantly Catholic: in 1904, farmers 
in the Catholic provinces (Noord-Brabant and Limburg) made up 73 per cent of the NBB’s 
membership, and these groupings were dominated by Catholics even in predominantly Protestant 
northern provinces.
94 
Largely for geopolitical reasons, serious conflict soon arose between regional and federal 
unions, the NBB and the NCB. In 1898 this led to establishing two central banks for the Netherlands’ 
new boerenleenbanken, one based in Utrecht and sponsored by the NBB, the other, based in 
Eindhoven, by the NCB. The NBB’s bank rapidly changed to a neutral institution and formally 
disaffiliated from the NBB, but the NCB’s central bank kept its requirement that members sign up to 
religious principles: ‘furthering the interest of God, the family and property’.95 In consequence, new 
boerenleenbanken established after 1898 could choose their network: Catholics generally chose 
Eindhoven because it more closely represented their interests, while Protestants chose Utrecht, 
because it was different.
96
 The confessionalization of apex institutions resulted in a de facto 
confessionalization of local Raiffeisen units, with a bank for each Christian denomination in many 
villages. The foundation date of many banks suggests a reaction to the establishment nearby of one for 
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 Banks benefited from catering exclusively for one religious community; peer 
monitoring was easier, and social sanctions while cheaper to administer were more costly for 
offenders. 
Meanwhile, in Ireland, rather than embrace and use confessional politics to their advantage, 
cooperative leaders tried initially to avoid this; they never actively took advantage of the polity’s 
religious and political split as the Dutch had.
98
 O’Rourke argues that the political divisions following 
from sectarianism were actively antipathetic towards dairy cooperation.
99
 It is unclear whether the 
same held true for Raiffeisen societies, since most were located among a relatively homogenous 
population, in terms of religious and political affiliation.
 
And, unlike the Netherlands, they had only 
one apex institution, the IAOS, which had declared itself to be non-religious and apolitical; Protestants 
and Roman Catholics were involved at the highest levels of its management. While rare, a few 
incidents can be found which together suggest that socioreligious divisions may have contributed 
towards the failure of Irish Raiffeisenism. One example comes from the village of Cliff in Co. Sligo, 
where 91 per cent of the population was Catholic. In a letter to IAOS secretary R. A. Anderson, local 
IAOS organizer Paul Gregan writes that he fears ‘the fires of political and religious dissension’ may 
lead to the bank’s downfall, for the local Catholic population had ‘retreated’ from the bank.100  
Political divisions were, however, extremely important at the national level, given that most 
Raiffeisen societies depended on concessional loans from government bodies. Besides being IAOS 
president, Horace Plunkett was a sitting MP (1892-1900), a member of the CDB and vice-president of 
DATI; his position gave him influence on governmental policy towards Raiffeisen banks. When 
Plunkett lost his parliamentary seat in 1900, he anomalously held the junior ministerial post of vice-
president of DATI for five more years. He was removed from office only after changes in government. 
Plunkett’s successor at DATI was T. W. Russell, who, it is claimed, was openly hostile towards all 
forms of cooperation.
101
 Anderson highlights his antipathy to credit cooperatives: ‘He [Russell] 
declared publicly that the system under which the credit societies were formed was “rotten and 
indefensible” and gave it as his opinion that the £24,000 lent by the Board was “not worth more than 
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half a crown in the £.”’ 102  Following Russell’s appointment, various government bodies began 
reviewing the policy of concessional loans, which explains in part the timing of the divergence in 
cooperative banks per capita in figure 1. 
Confessionalization in the Netherlands had other advantages; clerical and teacher involvement 
in the running of their Raiffeisen societies were important aspects of cooperation. As mentioned, many 
banks had priests as spiritual advisors to their boards. Although their influence varied considerably, in 
some banks these priests had de facto power of veto over bank decision making, strengthening the link 
between congregation and clientele.
103
 However, in Ireland, clerical assistance was not widespread, 
despite the prominent support of the Jesuit priest Thomas Finlay, professor of political economy at 
University College Dublin.
104
 Catholic priests were, if anything, apathetic towards mutual societies; 
the assistant commissioner for Friendly Societies in Ireland in the 1870s noted: ‘Roman Catholic 
clergymen have […] never used their very great influence to promote these institutions; but I must in 
justice say that I have met with no instance of a Roman Catholic clergymen thwarting them in any 
way, or denouncing them’.105  
The Irish Catholic clergy was not a homogeneous body and clerical support was probably 
determined by numerous conflicting factors. Kennedy notes: ‘without doubt the clergy entertained a 
general sympathy for any attempts that might appear to promote the economic prosperity of their 
congregations, provided there were no adverse side-effects as viewed from the vantage point of the 
Catholic Church’.106 If cooperative ventures threatened the economic interests of the Church, or those 
of its prominent financial contributors, or if direct kinship ties were at risk, the clergy could even 
actively oppose cooperation. Given that the IAOS had declared that Raiffeisen societies were to be 
used to attack gombeenism, or rather rural shopkeepers, they might if successful have impinged on the 
wealthier patrons of the Church; the mixed loyalties of the clergy help to explain its lack of 
participation in Raiffeisen societies.
107 
Clerical involvement would certainly have been useful; priests 
could have been an important link between businesses and the society they served. There was already 
a de facto confessionalization of the Irish education system, leading to clerical control over the 
patronage of schools;
108 
clerical involvement in cooperatives could have encouraged local teachers to 
act as cooperatives’ treasurers, in much the same way as they did in the Netherlands. 
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Limited versus unlimited liability was a divisive issue across Europe; many influential actors in both 
Ireland and the Netherlands believed unlimited liability constrained cooperative banking.
109 
From an 
asset pricing perspective, unlimited liability means that debt holders have full recourse, thus 
shareholders give more weight to both tails of asset returns, encouraging them to monitor more closely 
the efforts of their peers. Unlimited liability implies that if a credit cooperative were to fold, all its 
members would be liable for all outstanding debts. But it does not imply that the liability would be 
shared equally; if the asset holdings of members were not homogeneous, then those with more assets 
(i.e. more deposits) would be forced to contribute more to any settlement. As all cooperatives chose 
unlimited liability in accordance with Raiffeisen’s principles, there could in theory have been some 
reluctance to join them. In practice, this was a problem only in Ireland. Why? 
When JSBs were formed in the early nineteenth century, they were established as unlimited 
liability enterprises. By the advent of Raiffeisen institutions, most of the polity’s banks had limited 
their liability in some way.
110  
Before limited liability was introduced to the UK, contemporary 
observers of the banking system often complained that unlimited liability attracted low-wealth 
individuals and repelled the wealthy.
111 
It was argued that choosing unlimited liability resulted in a de 
facto limitation in any case: too little information on the financial assets of shareholding peers 
discourages wealthier shareholders from participating. However, using data on the composition of 
bank shareholders in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, before and after the limitation of Ulster 
Bank shareholders’ liability, Acheson and Turner show that this limitation increased if anything the 
proportion of equity-holders with low wealth.
112 
What makes Raiffeisen banks so different from JSBs 
is that shareholdings were not valuable: purchasing a share in a JSB required substantial sums of 
money to be surrendered, whatever eventual additional liability claim came with it, while joining a 
Raiffeisen bank required merely a signature. “Shareholders” in Raiffeisen societies may therefore have 
been of the poor quality identified by contemporaries.  
Rural Ireland was not a homogeneous society; to ensure success, a credit cooperative required 
participation from diverse interests. Other cooperative enterprises (dairies, stores) were limited 
liability organizations, registered under the more favourable acts covering industrial and provident 
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societies. Lee argues that the unlimited liability clause hampered the outreach capacity theoretically 
enjoyed by such business organizations, because members may have voted to exclude those with 
insufficient means.
113
 Land occupation statistics support an unequal distribution: in 1894, when 
Raiffeisen societies first came to Ireland, 84 per cent of farms were smaller than 12 hectares, and 16 
per cent, the wealthiest, exceeded 20 hectares.
114
 Conversely to Lee’s argument, it is highly plausible 
that large land occupiers were discouraged from participating in Raiffeisen societies. Moreover, 
wealthier landholders had no pressing need to join one, having access to other credit streams, 
including limited liability cooperative creameries, and could invest in various financial securities, 
including JSB shares, in their local communities.
115
 The result was that the most “desirable” members 
were absent from the Raiffeisen projects of many villages, rendering them unsustainable in the long 
run. If the wealthier members of Irish society had joined Raiffeisen banks, contributing their 
knowledge, expertise and wealth, the quality of leadership and administration might have been 
enhanced.  
Unlike Ireland, the Netherlands had no equivalent to the rural JSBs. Provincial banking houses 
were small partnerships, and large joint stock commercial banks of Amsterdam and Rotterdam began 
branching only in the early 1910s.
 
While wealthy Irish agriculturalists could access a local JSB branch, 
their Dutch counterparts had no such option. Like Ireland, Dutch society was not homogenous in terms 
of wealth-holding, but verzuiling ensured that communities were instead homogenous in terms of 
socioreligious identity. Raiffeisenism became an attractive proposition for the rural elite, also; better-
off Dutch farmers overcame the problems associated with the lack of valuable shareholding suffered 
by Ireland’s Raiffeisen banks with peer monitoring and social punishment. They even helped to run 
their banks, taking full advantage of their socioreligious proximity to their less-wealthy peers. 
 
VII 
By comparing Ireland and the Netherlands, this article argues that the latter promoted Raiffeisenism 
successfully because: (1) Dutch Raiffeisen banks mobilized members’ savings, while their Irish 
counterparts did not; (2) unlike Irish ones, Dutch cooperative enterprises were highly integrated into 
the rural economy; and (3) Raiffeisen societies took advantage of the segregation of Dutch society, 
while Irish socioreligious and socioeconomic divisions militated against their successful development. 
While reason (1) was probably the most important, it was insufficient alone to ensure their success. 
Conversely, it is doubtful whether Irish cooperatives would have succeeded if they had been more 
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integrated, horizontally or vertically, or able to take advantage of Irish social divisions, without also 
being able to mobilize rural savings on a large scale.  
Together, this paper’s three categories of reasons for the divergent performance of 
Raiffeisenism abroad inform a new comparison of the financial functions performed by cooperative 
banks for rural customers. Of five functions that Merton argues to be key to any financial service 
sector, the Dutch boerenleenbanken performed four and Irish agricultural banks two only (see table 4). 
In particular, Ireland’s Raiffeisen societies failed to provide ways of managing uncertainty and risk 
and to minimize information asymmetries and incentive problems. Incumbent institutions already 
performed these functions and probably benefited from being first-movers; no institutional advantages 
were gained from the peculiar design of Raiffeisen’s banks in the Irish context. 
[Insert table 4] 
As discussed in the introduction, this article is motivated by the pioneering work of Guinnane, 
who argues that Irish cooperatives were a failure for three reasons: (1) competition in savings markets 
from the POSB; (2) the weakness of the IAOS as an apex institution; and (3) detrimental norms 
peculiar to Irish society.
116
 This article strengthens and revises Guinnane’s conclusions as follows: (1) 
it was competition from JSBs rather than the POSB that hampered Raiffeisenism in Ireland, 
competitors largely absent from Dutch markets, where a post office bank also operated; (2) the IAOS 
chose not to establish a federated clearinghouse to survive this competition, while Dutch apex 
institutions were free to fully integrate into the rural economy; and (3) the poor trust Guinnane 
observes in Irish society can be explained by socioreligious and socioeconomic division. 
In conclusion, in light of the discussion in this article, Guinnane may be said to have asked the 
wrong question; the issue is not why Raiffeisen banks failed in Ireland, but rather why they succeeded 
in the Netherlands. The Netherlands had a highly segmented market, with different specialist financial 
institutions serving different groups. Raiffeisen banks could take advantage of a large, still mostly 
unpopulated niche within this market, unpopulated, at least, by banks that could reap full benefit from 
embedding themselves in their society. In contrast, Ireland enjoyed competitive, unsegmented markets 
in which incumbents, such as JSBs and savings banks, already offered rural societies a full 
complement of financial services; new entrants had little room and little advantage was to be gained 
from cooperative ownership. 
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Table 1. The institutional attributes of German Raiffeisen banks and their Irish and Dutch imitations 
Institutional attribute Germany Ireland The Netherlands 
Enterprise form Specific cooperative form Choice of forms, neither designed 
for cooperatives 
Choice of forms, varying 
appropriateness 
Scale of operation Local, mostly rural Local, only rural Local, mostly rural 
Polity coverage National Regional (mainly in the west) National 
Liability structure Unlimited Unlimited, regardless of enterprise 
form 
Unlimited, regardless of enterprise 
form 
Loan security Cosignatories, property Cosignatories Cosignatories; other collateral 
considered 
Loan term Varied (short-, medium- and long-
term) 
Short-term only (one year 
maximum) 
Varied (short-, medium- and long-
term) 
Government subsidy Little (some subsidized government 
loans) 
Heavy subsidization (concessional 
loans) 
Nominal (small start-up grants) 
Use of profits Retained Retained Retained 
Source of capital Savings deposits Government and JSB loans Savings deposits 
Unit independence Yes; but influenced by apex 
institutions 
Yes Yes; but influenced by apex 
institutions 
Paid management Only treasurer is paid None Only treasurer is paid 
Federated apex institutions Separate regional clearing and audit 
unions 
None Combined confessional clearing and 
audit unions (central banks) 
Cooperative integration Integrated with other cooperative 
enterprises 
None Integrated with other cooperative 
enterprises 
Source: Own research, based on the schema used in Hollis and Sweetman, ‘Microcredit’, and Guinnane, ‘The early German credit cooperatives’. 
Table 2. Agricultural output per hectare in Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands 
 Germany  Ireland  The Netherlands 
 1871 1891 1911  1871 1891 1911  1871 1891 1911 
Wheat 1.17 1.40 1.98  1.52 2.15 2.50  1.65 1.60 2.63 
Barley 1.34 1.55 1.99  1.91 2.33 2.42  2.17 2.10 2.79 
Oats 1.17 1.53 1.78  1.59 1.95 2.04  1.97 2.01 2.17 
Potatoes 5.90 7.43 10.35  6.63 10.12 15.71  7.04 7.11 14.88 
Sugar beet  24.77 18.84      37.92 18.30 35.80 
Sources: Own calculation, using Mitchell, International historical statistics, Maddison, The world 
economy, and Knibbe, Agriculture in the Netherlands. 
 
 
Table 3. Livestock per 1,000 of the population in Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands 
 Germany  Ireland  The Netherlands 
 1873 1892 1913  1871 1891 1911  1885 1891 1910 
Horses 90 78 71  100 127 141  74 59 55 
Cattle 395 362 323  737 951 1,076  415 334 339 
Pigs 1,774 251 395  300 292 325  122 119 211 
Sheep 625 280 85  784 1,009 892  213 177 149 
Goats 57 64 54         
Poultry     2,171 3,264 5,809     
Sources: Own calculation, using Mitchell, International historical statistics, and Maddison, The world 
economy. 
 
Table 4. The financial functions performed by German Raiffeisen banks and their Irish and Dutch 
imitations 
Financial function Germany Ireland The Netherlands 
Provides payments 
systems to facilitate 
economic exchange 
Some Some, not available 
nationally 
Some, hampered by 
confessionalization 
Pools funds to 
undertake enterprise 




resources across time, 
geography and 
industry  
Across time and 
within large 
geographic areas 
Only across time Across time and 
geographies, but within 
religious community  
Provides ways of 
managing uncertainty 
and risk 
Yes No, reliant on 
government whim 






Yes No Yes, facilitated by 
confessionalization 
Source: Own research, based on the schema used in Merton, ‘A functional perspective’. 
 
 Figure 1. Number of active Raiffeisen banks in Ireland and the Netherlands per 100,000 people, 1899–
1919 
Notes: In 1919, total assets of all Raiffeisen banks to total population were £0.007 per person in Ireland 
and fl.20.73 (approx. £2) per person in the Netherlands. 
Sources: IAOS, Annual reports 1899-1920, for the number of banks in Ireland. CCB, Jaarverslagen 
1904-1919; CCCB, Jaarverslagen 1904-1919; CCRB, Jaarverslagen 1904-1919, for the number of banks 
in the Netherlands. Maddison, The world economy, for population estimates. 
 
